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Konferenzpaper | Open Access

High-Order Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation

Autor*innen
Baranski, Bastian ; Bartz-Beielstein, Thomas ; Ehlers, Rüdiger ; Kajendran, Thusinthan ; Kosslers, Björn ; Mehnen, Jörn ; Polaszek, Tomasz ; Reimholz, Ralf ; Schmidt, Jens ; Schmitt, Karlheinz ; Seis, Danny ; Slodzinski, Rafael ; Steeg, Simon ; Wiemann, Nils ; Zimmermann, Marc
DOI
10.1145/1143997.1144065
ISBN-13
#defaultkonferenzband 9781595931863

Weitere Details

Sprache
englisch
Darstellungsform
Text
Seitenbereich
379 - 380

The Prisoner's Dilemma and the Public Goods Game are models to study mechanisms leading to the evolution of cooperation. From a simplified rational and egoistic perspective there should be no altruistic cooperation in these games at all. Previous studies observed circumstances under which cooperation can emerge. This paper demonstrates that high-order punishment opportunities can maintain a higher cooperation level in an agent based simulation of the evolution of cooperation.

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